The logical features of causality (necessary connection, succession , and contiguity) are examined in regard to respondent and operant behaviors. It is emphasized that operant behavior as emitted behavior breaks with any criterion of precedent causality. It is examined how Skinner tried to approach causality as functional relation, without overcoming a pure phenomenological analysis. The category of contingency is submitted to a conceptual analysis, and its application to superstition , respondent and operant conditioning is critically reviewed . A reinterpretation of contingency as conditionality is proposed , and the analysis of the organization of behavior is advocated in terms of interdependent functional and occurrence contingencies.
The concept of causality is essential to scientific thinking . Explanation is conceived as a theoretical and empirical process directed to identifying the "causes" of phenomena. Although during the last four centuries the prevailing conception of causality originated in classical mechanics, the advances in the experimental sciences have raised new approaches to causality. Probabilistic and field conceptions are relevant examples of these new approaches to causality.
I shall examine causality in relation to contingency as conceived by B. F. Skinner (1938) , in order to show some ambiguities in the definition and use of the concept of contingency. I shall propose, also, that if the logical boundaries of the concept of contingency are clearly established, contingency may ·become the central concept for causal descriptions in psychology.
On Causes and Functional Relationships
The traditional conception of the reflex (Sechenov, 1866 , 1978 Bekhterew, 1913; Pavlov, 1927 -English translation) postulated a necessary relationship between the presentation of a stimulus with given properties and the elicited occurrence of a response, the so-called reflex or unconditional response. The relationship between the unconditional stimulus and the unconditional response fulfilled the traditional criteria of Reprint requests may be sent to Emilio Ribes-Inesta , Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones en Comportamiento, 12 de diciembre 204 (Col. Chapalita) , Guadalajara, Jal. 45020 (Mexico) . Email: ribes@udgserv.cencar.udg.mx objective causality provided by Descartes (1986, in Treatise on the world) or of perceived causality provided by Hume (1977, in Treatise on human nature): contiguity, succession, and necessary connection.
The extension by Skinner (1935) of the reflex concept to the socalled emitted behavior tacitly questioned this dominant conception of causality. Although Hume had eliminated causality as an inherent property of objects, conceiving causality as a "belief" based upon coincident regularities of events, cause continued to be based on the canons of Cartesian mechanics: successive production, temporal and spatial contiguity, and necessary relationship. Operant behavior, however, in contrast to reflexive behavior, was emitted and nonproduced. With the occurrence of an operant behavior, it was not possible to identify the preceding stimulus required to establish the necessary connection by successive production under temporal and spatial contiguity. Operant behavior, in contrast to reflexive behavior, occurred continuously and was emitted and non-elicited.
The apparently "spontaneous" nature of operant behavior was described by Skinner (1938) as follows:
There is a large body of behavior that does not seem to be elicited, in the sense in which a cinder in the eye elicits closure of the lid, although it may eventually stand in a different kind of relation to external stimuli. The original 'spontaneous' activity of the organism is chiefly of this sort, as is the greater part of the conditioned behavior of the adult organism ... Merely to assert that there must be eliciting stimuli is an unsatisfactory appeal to ignorance ... (But) an event may occur without any observed antecedent event and still be dealt with adequately in a descriptive science. I do not mean that there are no orienting forces in spontaneous behavior but simply that they are not located in the environment. We are not in a position to see them, and we have no need to. This kind of behavior might be said to be emitted by the organism, and there are appropriate techniques for dealing with it in that form. One important independent variable is time. In making use of it I am simply recognizing that the observed datum is the appearance of a given identifiable sample of behavior at some more or less orderly rate ... The term reflex will be used to include both respondent and operant even though in its original meaning it applied to respondent only. A single term for both is convenient because both are topographical units of behavior and because an operant may and usually does acquire a relation to prior stimulation . In general, the notion of a reflex is to be emptied of any connotation of the active 'push' of the stimulus. The terms refer here to correlated entities, and to nothing more. (pp. 19-21) According to this reasoning, Skinner (1938) defined and identified operant behavior in strictly descriptive and noncorrelational terms:
An operant is an identifiable part of behavior of which it may be said, not that no stimulus can be found that will elicit it (there may be a respondent the response of which has the same topography), but that no correlated stimulus can be detected upon occasions when it is observed to occur . . . The strength of an operant is proportional to its frequency of occurrence, and the dynamic laws describe the changes in the rate of occurrence that are brought about by various operations performed upon the organism. (p. 21)
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From this perspective the operant is not caused in the classical sense, to the extent that it is not possible to identify a consistent, necessary, contiguous and antecedent stimulus regarding the "response." When Skinner extended the reflex concept to operant behavior as the basic analytic unit, he inadvertently dispelled causal analysis of behavior. How did Skinner replace causal analysis in the description and explanation of behavior?
On one hand, the solution consisted of functional descriptions stressing a correlational analysis in real time. Causal analysis was thus partly replaced by functional analysis of behavior. On the other hand, the recuperation of the original sense of conditioning as the establishment of conditional relations, led to the gradual introduction of the concept of contingency, although it was ambiguously used.
Contingency and correlation of events in time coincided as descriptive dimensions of the concept of reinforcement. The relationship between reinforcers and operant responses was given three kinds of description, depending on the quantitative level of restriction specified by the contingency:
(1) As conditional relations: This occurs in interval schedules in which the reinforcer frequency is conditional on one response allocated in time but independent of responding frequency;
(2) As dependency relations: This occurs in ratio schedules in which reinforcer frequency is dependent on response frequency; and (3) As circumstantial relations: This occurs in concurrent schedules in which the distribution and time allocation of response frequency change from moment to moment the availability of reinforcers.
These three uses of the concept of contingency embracing responsereinforcer relationships, were summarized by Schoenfeld, Cole, Lang, and Mankoff (1973) by saying that contingency describes or specifies the distribution of reinforcers as a function of the distribution of responses.
Contingency and Coincidence
. In operant theory the concept of reinforcement stipulated the conditionality of an event regarding behavior and the correlation of the event and behavior in real time. Skinner (1938) asserted that in the case of conditioned operant behavior the defining property of a class is exactly that given by the conditions of reinforcement. (p. 38) Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the concept of reinforcement was apparent when Skinner (1948) stated that to say that a reinforcement is contingent upon a response may mean nothing more than that it follows the response. It may follow it because of some mechanical connection or because of the mediation of another organism; but conditioning takes place presumably because of the temporal relation only, expressed in terms of order and proximity of response and reinforcement. (p. 168) The reduction of the contingency to a mere temporal relation misrepresented the difference between coincident and conditional events. The interpretation of the experiment by Skinner on "superstition" in the pigeon strengthened the conceptual ambiguity in distinguishing contingency from coincidence (or dependency from contiguity). Skinner's interpretation has several important aspects.
(1) Skinner found that without the specification of a discrete, repetitive, predetermined response as a condition of providing the delivery of food, and providing food only according to elapsing of time (periodic or fixed time reinforcement), the "spontaneous," ''free'' behavior of the pigeon tended to become stereotyped. The animal repeated, with progressive variations in time (topography drifting), a relatively constant pattern of responding cOinciding with the behavior occurring when food was provided (clockwise movements, bowing, etc.). The relatively consistent repetition of those behavior patterns-and not of isolated response instances-led Skinner to consider the repetition as a reinforcement effect, that is, an increase of the future probability of responding in terms of frequency of occurrence. Nevertheless, it is evident that the stereotyping of pigeons' behavior taking place due to the time-correlated delivery of food was not, strictly speaking, a reinforcement effect according to the definition of reinforcement. First, the effect of food on behavior consisted of the repetition of a molar pattern of behavior and not the typical repetition of a discrete, atomic instance of responding in time. Second, because the behavior pattern "filled in" the overall interval between "reinforcers," it was difficult to speak about a genuine increase in the frequency of responding. Third, because of the stereotyped character of the resulting behavior pattern, it was not possible to evaluate the quantitative effects of intermittent reinforcement on the frequency of responding during the interreinforcement interval. In spite of these limitations, "superstition" was considered to be a "corollary of operant conditioning" (Herrnstein, 1966) .
(2) In the "superstition" study "non-contingent reinforcement" was delivered on the behavior "stream" (Schoenfeld & Farmer, 1970) without restriction, excepting the scheduled food-delivery interval. The behavior of the pigeon in the experimental chamber consisted of a continuous stream of emitted behavior (which could be described as unconditioned operants) which did not allow the identification of response classes by mere observation. The presentation of food coincided in each pigeon with a portion of the behavior stream, even when in all cases such portion of the behavior stream ended with terminal responding related to food consumption. The concept of reinforcement requires the operant to be specified in terms of a defining property: the response characteristic related to the "reinforcer" contingency, that is, the property of responding that is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of the covariating stimulus-the reinforcer. In the case of the superstition experiment it is not possible to specify a defining property on the response side, because the contingency depends on time elapsing irrespectively of any characteristic or property of behavior. In superstition no predetermined criterion restricts the conditionality of the reinforcer in relation to a behavior characteristic. Because of this, in noncontingent reinforcement there is no defining property identifying the operant class. In the superstition situation there are only nondefining properties. These are properties that vary in time and that do not establish the boundaries of a response class. In order to identify the boundaries of the response class in superstition, the defining property should be equated with the physical boundaries of the geographical setting (the experimental chamber), but if that were done no reinforcement effect could be ever found, because any response would be functionally identical to all possible responses. Movement within the chamber would be the "response" to be reinforced, but reinforcement would not be possible because the "response" would fill in the interreinforcement time on every occasion. Stereotyped behavior in superstition (Staddon & Ayres, 1975; Staddon & Simmelhag, 1971; Ribes & Chavez, 1988) seems to be functionally different from that obtained under intermittent schedules of reinforcement (Ferster, 1958) . Stereotyped behavior in superstition seems to be an effect of "interrupting" behavior (Schoenfeld & Cole, 1972) , similar to the role attributed by Guthrie (1935) to reinforcement as the event "closing" or "protecting" an act.
(3) In common with Pavlov, Skinner (1938) chose the alimentary reflex to study operant behavior. The "chain" of the alimentary operant reflex did not end in pressing the lever, but in the delivery and consumption of food. The contingency of eating behavior regarding pressing the lever transformed the latter in a sample of the alimentary response or reflex. In the superstition experiment the conditionality or contingency between food presentation and the occurrence of a predetermined response was eliminated. Nevertheless, eating behavior remained conditional or contingent upon orienting, approaching and manipulatory responses regarding the food magazine. Thus, the defining property of the alimentary reflex was restricted to the last component of the behavior chain, that was never measured, at the time no contingency was specified relating food presentation with a predetermined response as key pecking. This analysis suggests that the superstition study did not eliminate the contingency between eating and prior behavior. The double contingency between key pecking, food delivery, and operant responses related to approaching, manipulating, and ingesting food was simplified.
In eliminating the first contingency criterion between a "sample" of behavior prior to eating, the effect was to increase the variation of responding other than those responses sharing the defining property (the contingency criterion) related to food consumption (approaching, manipulating and ingesting).
(4) The superstition experiment showed that the effect of food on behavior did not exclusively depend on the contingency relation between a predetermined response and the delivery of food. The emergence of stereotyped behavior patterns was shown to be different in every pigeon, with a progressive change over time in each of them, and with changes in the interreinforcement interval. The absence of a contingency regarding a specific response prior to eating increased the variation of responses within and between subjects. Nevertheless, because the temporal availability of food in the food magazine remained constant, the last component of the alimentary operant response was shown to be the same in all pigeons: pecking into the food magazine as soon as food was available. Contrary to Skinner's interpretation, contingency can not be reduced to a mere temporal relation, even when the contingency specifies a temporal restriction determined by the contact between certain properties of behavior and the presentation or action of stimulus objects. In the superstition experiment the pigeon did not "cause" or produce the presentation of food, but the consumption of food was contingent upon explicit specific behaviors by the pigeon.
The preceding observations distinguish between coincidence and contingency, showing that the latter can not be reduced to the former.
Contingency and Dispositional Categories
The concept of contingency is naturally traceable to the method of conditioning. Pavlov used to talk about conditional and unconditional stimuli and responses, emphasizing conditional relations between events. The English translation by Anrep of The Conditioned Reflexes replaced the term conditional by the term conditioned, distorting the original sense of the analysis of behavior as conditional relations between stimulus and response events. 1 Although in classical conditioning the eliciting relation between the unconditional stimulus and response made possible a causal interpretation of responding by the action of the stimulus, in operant conditioning the emitted character of behavior did not allow for interpreting the response as a cause of the reinforcer presentation and, at the same time, the reciprocal causal effect of the reinforcer on the responses that followed. In his paper on "Two types of conditioned reflex: A reply to Konorski and Miller," Skinner (1937) clearly distinguished operant behavior from respondent behavior pointing to the absence of 1When Anrep translated "conditional" as "conditioned" he transformed a concept related to circumstance or relation into a concept of achievement. Anrep displaced the analysis from the conditions in which a relation was established between stimulus and response properties to the response and the stimulus as loci of an effect.
an eliciting stimulus for operant behavior. Skinner described the contingency relation for both behaviors as a temporal correlation.
Different types of conditioned reflexes arise because a reinforcing stimulus may be presented in different kinds of temporal relations. There are two fundamental cases: in one the reinforcing stimulus is correlated temporally with a response and in the other with a stimulus. For "correlated with" we might write "contingent upon." (p.272) In this distinction of re~pondent and operant conditioning Skinner missed the basic feature: In respondent conditioning the response was produced (or elicited) by the reinforcer (the response was contingent upon the stimulus), whereas in operant conditioning the reinforcer was produced by the response (the stimulus was contingent upon the response). The distinction rests on the conditionality of one of the members of the relation regarding the other, and not as a mere temporal correlation.
The analysis of contingency as a temporal relation transformed the causal connection of the reinforcer regarding the response to a mere actuarial description of the tendency or probability of occurrence of a response "followed by" a reinforcing stimulus. Reinforcement became a dispositional category (Ryle, 1949) describing the likelihood of occurrence of instances of a population of responses given the presentation of a particular class of stimuli. Because operant behavior was "emitted," it was not possible either to state causal relations between operant behavior and antecedent stimuli. The relation between operant behavior and antecedent stimuli (so-called discriminative [and delta] stimuli) was similar to that postulated for reinforcement. Discriminative stimuli were conceived as the "occasion" for reinforcement and their function was to increase or decrease the likelihood of operant responses in their presence.
It is the nature of this kind of behavior that it should occur 'without an eliciting stimulus, although discriminative stimuli are practically inevitable after conditioning. It is not necessary to assume specific identifiable units prior to conditioning, but through conditioning they may be set up. (Skinner, 1937, p. 273) Skinner (1938) described the establishment of a correlation between an antecedent stimulus and operant behavior as follows:
The favorable situation is usually marked in some way, and the organism makes a discrimination of a kind now to be taken up. It comes to respond whenever a stimulus is present which has been present upon the occasion of a previous reinforcement and not to respond otherwise. The prior stimul~? does not elicit the response; it merely sets the occasion upon which the response will be reinforced. (p. 178) Discriminative stimuli, in contrast to eliciting stimuli, did not "produce" the operant response. The discriminative stimulus coincided with the reinforcement of the response, and to that extent, the organism "discriminated" that stimulus as an occasion for reinforcement. The discriminative stimulus, as the reinforcer, only affected the tendency of certain response classes. Thus, the three-term contingency was a dispositional statement describing two different moments (the discriminative stimulus and the reinforcer) regarding the tendency of occurrence of a set of particular responses (the operant).
Nevertheless, Skinner (1938) recognized that antecedent stimuli might have different functions depending upon the nature of responding.
The essence of type S is the substitution of one stimulus for another, or, as Pavlov has put it, signalization. It prepares the organism by obtaining the elicitation of a response before the original stimulus has begun to act, and it does this by letting any stimulus that has incidentally accompanied or anticipated the original stimulus act in its stead. In type R there is no substitution of stimuli and consequently no signalization. The type acts in another way: the organism selects from a large repertory of unconditioned movements those of which the repetition is important with respect to the production of certain stimuli. The conditioned response of Type R does not prepare for the reinforcing stimuli, it produces it. The process is very probable that referred to in Thorndike's Law of Effect. (p. 111)
Skinner emphasized different functions of responses. Respondents prepared for the stimulus while operants produced it. Skinner recognized that the unconditional stimulus did not depend on the response, and the reinforcer presentation did depend upon the response occurrence. According to this argument, the operant-respondent distinction implied something more than just temporal relations between stimuli and responses. Nevertheless, in restricting signalization to the respondent, Skinner ignored the fact that the discriminative stimulus prompts the response in similar ways to that describing stimulus preparation for the respondent. Conditional and discriminative stimuli seem to be similar: Both are signals for other stimulus events. 2 In respondent conditioning the antecedent stimulus (the so-called conditional stimulus) signals the occurrence of the unconditional stimulus, and in operant conditioning the antecedent stimulus (the so-called discriminative stimulus) signals that a 21t has been usually asserted (Terrace, 1966) that although the conditional stimulus elicits a response the discriminative stimulus only sets the occasion for its occurrence. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of classical conditioning does not support the eliciting function of the conditional stimulus, even as a low magnitude effect. The experimental literature (Beecroft, 1996) has documented the fragility and instability of direct respondent measures, characteristics that do not support the claim of an eliciting function by the conditional stimulus. By the same token , the observation of already established discriminative stimuli, when stimulus control involves steady behavior of high rates or as in tacting behavior, may be interpreted as an eliciting function. response is the occasion for the reinforcer presentation. From this perspective, the discriminative stimulus is not the occasion for reinforcement. The discriminative stimulus signals the occasion for reinforcement, that is, the occurrence of the operant response.
Contingency and the Distinction Between Respondent and Operant Behaviors
The concept of contingency may become central for describing and classifying the functional organization of behavior. To do so it is necessary to revisit the usual meaning of the term and to examine, initially, the conditionality relations involved in respondent and operant conditioning as particular cases of two general forms of the organization of behavior.
Contingency is usually understood as "possible, but uncertain," "likely, but not certain to happen," "accidental or not necessary," "happening by chance or unforeseen causes," "dependent on or conditioned by something else," and "something liable to happen as an adjunct to something else." None of these meanings deal with successive occurrence, coincidence, or contiguity. In referring an event as contingent upon another event, the contingency relation implies dependency, conditionality, and adjunctiveness. A Gontingency involves temporal relations between events, contiguity, and succession relations, but the contingency is not a temporal relation. 3 If contingency is applied to refer to conditional or dependent events or occurrences, it is possible to reformulate an analysis of the organization of behavior alternative to the traditional causal analysis.
The procedures employed in respondent and operant conditioning involve two different types of contingency relations, that have passed unnoticed. One type of conditional relation may specify the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a stimulus or response event, whereas a second type , of conditional relation may specify the functional properties of a stimulus or response event with respect to other(s). I shall name the first type of relation an occurrence-contingency and I shall name the second type of relation a function-contingency. Occurrence-contingencies specify if a occurs then b occurs relations, for example, if the tone is presented then food will be provided. Function-contingencies specify that a is functional for b because it goes with b relations, for example, pressing a bar takes place when food has been withdrawn because food is presented when bar pressing occurs.
If we look at the traditional paradigm of classical conditioning, several 'contingency relations may be identified. stimulus is contingent upon the conditional stimulus; (b) the unconditional response is contingent upon the unconditional stimulus; and, (c) the conditional response is contingent upon the conditional stimulus. The procedure involves the following function-contingencies: (a) the conditional stimulus is contingent upon the unconditional stimulus; (b) the conditional stimulus, (c) the unconditional stimulus, and (d) the conditional response are all contingent upon the unconditional response. Classical conditioning, in its simplest arrangement, may be described in terms of seven contingency relations, three of occurrence and four of function. The event that mediates the complete set of contingency relations is the unconditional stimulus, because its absence would preclude all the relations just described. Nevertheless, the unconditional stimulus can not be considered a causal event, because it follows both the conditional stimulus and the conditional response. But, by the same token, the occurrence of the conditional stimulus becomes the condition for the occurrence of the unconditional stimulus. This relation, however, is contingent and not necessary and can not be described as a causal relation. From this view, the complete set of relations are interdependent in occurrence and function, and can be interpreted only as an integrated contingency organization. The occurrence-contingencies describe the physical conditions of the total interaction, and the function-contingencies describe the functional conditions. The latter constitute what MerleauPonty (1976-Spanish translation) called the structure of behavior as the intentionality of a situation. A similar analysis can be made of operant conditioning, traditionally conceived as a three-term contingency. Figure 2 describes the contingency relations that may -be identified in the simplest arrangement of a discriminated operant. We may identify five occurrence-contingencies: (a) The reinforcer is contingent upon the occurrence of the operant response; (b) the reinforcer is contingent upon the presence of the discriminative stimulus; (c) the consummatory or terminal response is contingent upon the occurrence of the operant response; (d) the consummatory or terminal response is contingent upon the presentation of the reinforcer; and, (e) the operant response is contingent upon the presence of the discriminative stimulus. Besides, we may identify five function-contingencies: (a) The discriminative stimulus is contingent upon the reinforcer; (b) the discriminative stimulus is contingent upon the consummatory or terminal response; (c) the operant response is contingent upon the reinforcer; (d) the operant response is contingent upon the consummatory or terminal response; and (e) th"e reinforcing stimulus is contingent upon the consummatory or terminal response.
The difference between the conditional stimulus and tM discriminative stimulus consists of the -event being signaled by each one. The conditional stimulus signals the occurrence of the unconditional stimulus or reinforcer, whereas the discriminative stimulus signals which response is the occasion for reinforcement. The discriminative stimulus is functional because the reinforcer is presented after the operant Figure 2 . Description of the contingency relations in operant conditioning.
OPERANT CONDITIONING

OCCURRENCE CONTINGENCIES
response, but the discriminative stimulus, stricto sensus, is not a signal of the reinforcer. 4 In "superstition" and in autoshaping, the correlation of a stimulus with the further presentation of food or water does not correspond to the contingency relations taking place with the conditional stimulus or the discriminative stimulus. In "superstition" there are no occurrence-contingencies between food and the antecedent stimulus or between food and a predetermined response. In autoshaping (initially called by Brown & Jenkins, 1968 , a third type of superstition) there is a time-availability occurrence-contingency between food (or the so-called reinforcer) and the antecedent stimulus, but there is no occurrencecontingency regarding the measured response and food. The mere temporal correlation between a "neutral" stimulus and a so-called "reinforcer" is not sufficient for describing the stimulus functions that may develop as discriminative or conditional. The range of functional variations of stimuli correlating in time with a "reinforcer" seem to be wider than those encompassed by the terms "discriminative" and "conditional" (Farmer & Schoenfeld, 1966a , 1966b . Only through a contingency analysis of the occurrence and functional relations between stimuli and responses is it possible to identify the varied stimulus functions that may develop in "standard" preparations usually considered as operant conditioning procedures. This analysis shows four kinds of differences between classical and operant conditioning:
(1) Operant conditioning is more complex than classical conditioning in terms of the number of contingency relations.
(2) The mediating element in the complete set of contingencies is different in each case. In classical conditioning, the mediator is the unconditional stimulus, as previously shown, and in operant conditioning the mediator is the operant response. All the contingency relations are ultimately dependent in the occurrence of the operant response.
(3) In classical conditioning, the unconditional stimulus regulates the occurrence-and function-contingencies properties, whereas in operant conditioning the operant response regulates the occurrence-contingency and the consummatory or terminal response regulates the functioncontingency.5 The allocation of the contingency properties in different terms of the set of the contingencies may be considered as an additional index of functional complexity in the organization of behavior.
(4) Finally, it should be observed that if the mediator of the set of contingency relations of operant conditioning is eliminated, that is, the 4The function of the discriminative stimulus as a signal for responding and not as a signal of the reinforcer presentation is apparent in multiple and concurrent schedules, in which responding in each schedule component does not necessarily end with reinforcement. In spite of the nonreinforcement of responding in some schedule components, the discriminative stimulus "controls" rates and patterns characteristic of the ongoing schedules.
5When the operant and the consummatory responses are interchangeable in a situation, the Premack effect may be observed (Premack, 1962) . That means that both responses may play the role of operant and consummatory or terminal responses. operant response, then the set of relations becomes like the one in classical conditioning. This analysis stresses the progressive inclusion of contingency relations in the evolvement of the organization of behavior. Classical and operant conditioning are not seen as interacting "processes" in a horizontal dimension, but as forms of behavioral organization that are progressively inclusive in terms of occurrence and functional complexity. Operant conditioning always includes respondent contingency relations (Shapiro, 1960; Razran, 1971) .
Contingency and the Functional Organization of Behavior
A further analysis of conditional relations between behavior and environmental events (Ribes, 1986 ) may reveal additional levels in the organization of behavior.
8ehavior theory, in the form of conditioning theory, has been built advocating two general processes: Pavlovian-or respondentconditioning, and operant-"Or instrumental-conditioning. Recently, Sidman (1986) proposed an analysis of behavioral relations with stimuli based upon the number of contingency-terms. This analysis includes relations ranging from two-term contingencies (assumed to correspond to classical conditioning) to five-term contingencies (corresponding to second-order conditional discrimination procedures). Although Sidman (1994) recognized that contingencies would be better described as loops instead of linear relations, the analysis fails to distinguish between function and occurrence-contingency relations. Contingencies are analyzed only in terms of the number of events linearly related , without taking into account the multiple interdependencies that become established in the organization of behavioral interactions.
Although the contingency units composed by two, three, and four terms deal with different kinds of behavioral organizatton, many of the contingency relations are neglected. A thorough analysis of the five-term contingency .unit , corresponding to second-order conditional discrimination procedures, may show that there are no differences in behavioral organization as compared to the four-term contingency unit. The relations are similar because in the second-order conditional discrimination the second order stimulus(i) determine which is the "discriminative-stimulus-unit," consisting of the relation between the firstorder sample stimulus and the corresponding comparison stimulus. The five-term contingency involves, like the four-term contingency, the conditional values of a discriminative-stimulus unit depending upon a previous "conditioning" stimulus unit.
Occurrence-and function-contingencies play different roles in the organization of behavior. Occurrence-contingencies consist of relations in which the occurrence of an event "A" is the necessary condition for an event "8" to occur. This does not mean that "A" causes or produces "8." It simply means that "8" only occurs if "A" has occurred. The "8" if "A" relation involved in occurrence-contingencies requires some sort of temporal and spatial contiguity between both events. Occurrence-contingencies take place as real-time and space relations, and they are easily described as linear relations.
On balance, function contingencies involve apparent "retroactive" or "backward" relations in time and space. The descriptions in Figures 1  and 2 , show function-contingencies as "return" relations between events. The signaling functions of the conditional and discriminative stimulus are contingent upon the occurrence of the unconditional stimulus and response and upon the occurrence of the reinforcing stimulus, and the consummatory or terminal response, respectively. Functioncontingencies can not be conceived as linear time-space relations between events, because these contingencies do not involve conditions for occurrence or backward effects on time and space. Functioncontingencies deal with the integration of environmental and responding segments as a result of the interaction of the individual organism with contingent events on time and space. Function-contingencies involve synchronic relations of events in terms of the situation in which interactions take place. Because of this, discriminative, conditional, and instructional properties of stimuli are a result of the individual ultimately responding to consequences as consummatory or terminal responses. Other intermediate behaviors become functional only as integrated components of an interactive segment conditional to consummatory or terminal responses. Thus, in the traditional experimental preparation with food reinforcement, the conditional and discriminative stimuli as well as the operant responses become functional as components of an integrated alimentary behavior, which is contingent upon food consumption. 6 When response and stimulus events have conventional properties, as is the case with verbal stimuli and responses (Ribes, 1993b) , function-contingencies may be extended beyond the physical limits of the situation in which occurrence-contingencies take place. Although verbal events are not arbitrary in terms of their conventional uses, verbal responses, and response-produced verbal stimuli, may occur independent of the presence or absence of particular events. This characteristic of verbal events allows for "bridging" time and space in behavioral interactions, in such a way that an individual may be responding to a present situation in terms of the contingencies related to events in a situation that has already taken place or that may take place in the future. The functional extension of contingencies in time and space is the crucial dimension in which human social interactions emerge and develop.
When function-contingencies involve conventional stimulus and response events, occurrence-contingencies do not limit themselves to the strict contiguity relations typical of operant and respondent interactions. Occurrence-contingencies become mediated in time and 6This analysis fits with the original interpretations by Pavlov and Skinner about the functional Significance of presenting neutral stimuli before food delivery and lever pressing as part of the alimentary reflex.
space by conventional stimulus and response events, according to the relations established by function-contingencies in situations other than those in which present interactions take place. Most social interactions as well as complex behavior usually described as thinking and complex human learning seem to depend upon the hierarchical subordination of occurrence-contingencies to function-contingencies through the mediation of conventional events. Contingency-substitutional behavior (Ribes, 1991; 1993a) and function-altering stimuli (Schlinger, 1993) have been proposed to deal with these contingencies supraordinated to those involved in respondent and operant interactions.
